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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
)
)
)

J. W. BROADWATER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

)
)

GLEN VAN TASSELL, ERJv1A VA.i'l TASSELL,
his wife, and DICK VAN TASSELL,
Defendants and Appellants.

)
)

)

GLEN V.l>JI TASSELL, and ERMA VAN
TASSELL, his wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
VS,

J. W. BROADWATER and JANE DOE
BROADWATER, his wife, and A.i'lDREW
R. BIRRELL, JR., and PATRICIA J.
BIRRELL, his wife, and JOSEPH H.
SHOOL and JA.i'lE DOE SHOOL, his
wife,
Third Party Defendants.

)

Case No. 15319

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
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Michael Z. Haves
TIBBALS ..\.;\iD ST_l.TEN
Attorneys for Respondent
40,0 r:u"
.
~·
"'-. e 1..l or Bu1. 1 .d ing
77
Sout'i 200 East
)alt Lake ·.~itv, Utah 8H11

:-u

I

CRAIG STEPHENS COOK
Attorney for Appellants
3645 East 3100 Sout~
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

FILED
MAR 10 1978

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.'/ THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
J. W. BROADWATER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GWi VAN TASSELL, ERMA VA.i'i TASSELL,
his wife, and DICK VAN TASSELL,

Defendants and

Appellant~.

GLE~ VAN TASSELL, and ERMA VAi'\/
TASSELL, his wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
J. W. BROADWATER and JANE DOE
BROADWATER, his wife, and .il..J'\/DREW
R. BIRRELL, JR., and PA TRI CIA J.
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r;,r THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

J. W. BROADWATER,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
GLE:-1 VAN TASSELL, ERMA VAN
TASSELL, his wife, and DICK
V..\:i Ll.SSELL,

Defendants and
Appellants.
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)
)
)
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)
)
)

Case No. 15319

)
GLEN V..l.N TASSELL, and ERMA
VAN fASSELL, his wife,

Third Party Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

)

vs.
J. IV. BROADWATER and J."u\IE
DOE BRO ..l.DWATER, his wife,
and ANDREW R. BIRRELL, JR. ,

md PATRICIA J. BIRRELL,
his wife, and JOSEPH H.

SHOOL and JANE DOE SHOOL,
his wife,

Third Party Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~·)

APPELLA.\ITS' REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
),lt

bd1iJ,·,ring the points raised in Appellants' initial
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brief and Respondents' brief it suffices to say that th e q,,,.
,
tion of sufficiency of evidence and the discretion of the tr
court in refusing to accept newly-offered evidence are

50

ir.:

woven that they cannot be logically separated.
As has been stated previously the trial court was face6
with two diametrically opposed stories.

Van Tassell claime2

that he had paid Broadwater the full amount of the obligatior
and even an excess.

Broadwater, on the other hand, claimed

that only a very small portion of the debt had been paid to
him.

Since there was no question as to the initial obligatic:

incurred by Van Tassell as evidenced by the notes and mortga;
the sole question for determination was that of receipts--11er,
the gasoline receipts offered by Van Tassell sufficient evi·
dence to show payment of the debt?
Respondents in their brief emphasize that Van Tassell
adamantly stated that the gasoline receipts were not signed
by Broadwater until the amount of payment had been physicaL
placed upon the receipt.

(Respondents' Brief, PP· 6-7). !'.·:

theory then continues that since Mr. Grube testified that Lo
.
· coses oi
examination of the receipts showed that in a 11 si.:< "
11
the receipts examined the signatures were p 1 ace d before ,:

payment notations that it was conclusive that Van Tassell'"''
have altered the receipts after Broadwater had merely
them for gasoline.
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sig~.::

It should be noted, however, that only six of the fourteen disputed receipts could be examined by Mr. Grube.
left eight receipts with no examination.
tirnony by

~Ir.

This

A review of the tes-

Van Tassell hardly shows that he was positive

as to the order of the signatures but in fact stated that in
so~

instances the gasoline would have been signed for by Mr.

Broadwater and that the notations would be placed on the receipt after such signature.

A few brief excerpts of the tes-

tirnony show this fact.
Q.

(By Mr. Fullmer) Okay now, back to
these receipts. Did you ever get the
receipt made out and signed and about
to take it out and then the money was
discussed?

A.

That happened quite a few different
times.

Q.

So in a circumstance, when was this
information about paying, receiving
money from you to him be put on there?

A.

Well, it was in the machine and while
we were talking.

Q.

So would his signature be on it or
not?

A.

His signature, when I gave him the-no, his signature wasn't on it till
I wrote it out and then we would sign
it,

Q.

But then for instance, you could tell
if he had signed it before you put
this, number l+, if he signed it before you put this $2,500 on it or after,
can you?
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A.

Sometimes he got the gas and
signed and then we would be talkino
and maybe I would pay him and mayb;
he would already have signed it. I
wouldn't say that it couldn't have
happened, but generally he would sign
it after he got the money and stuff.
It could have happened, I wouldn't
say it didn't, but it was signed before it was ever taken out of the box
and he had a copy of it.
(Tr., p.
10 9) .

>lo.

Respondent cites page 137 of the transcript to support
Tassell's sureness of the order of signature.
brief, p. 7).

\'a:.

(Responden:

A review of this testimony shows that Van

Tassell was anything but sure.

Q.

(By Mr. Tibbals) Had you written
that on there at the time Mr. Broadwater signed that receipt?

A.

I did.

Q.

It was written on there at the
time he signed it?

A.

As far as I know, that's the way I
remember.
It's put on the machine
and then he signed it and we would
give it to him and he would sign on-sometimes he may have signed it and
I wrote it on there and gave him
the machine or gave him the money.

Q.

Well, that becomes quite significant,
doesn't it, because if he didn't put
his name on there after you wrote the
$2,500 on there, he wasn't receipting
for the $2,500, was he? He was just
receipting for the gas?

A.

Well no, what he did was get the gas
and then he would sign, might have
signed it.
I wouldn't sav that he
did or didn't, but then he would then
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0

say, "Do you want to give me any
money?" and sometimes I would give
it to him and write it there.
I
couldn't say.
Sometimes it had been
signed before and sometimes after,
but most of the time I would say,
ninety-nine per cent of the time, he
would sign it after I gave him the
money.
But, I can't remember exactly.
There is a possibility.
(Tr.,
p. 137).
Neither Broadwater nor Van Tassell disputed the fact that
all signatures were made in the machine.

Nor was there any

dispute that the receipts contained three separate pieces of
paper separated by carbons which were disgarded at the time
the three copies were removed from the machine and the perforated ends were broken.

Testimony was clear that Broadwater

either received a pink copy or a yellow copy of the invoice.
Broadwater produced no copies of any receipts at the trial.
Van Tassell claimed that all the writing was done in the
machine and that Broadwater accordingly signed it in the maIf, as Respondent claims, Van Tassell altered the ori-

chine.

ginal white receipt after it had been removed from the machine
and a copy given to Broadwater then he would also have had to

have altered the second copy in order to show a consistent res ult,

Unfortunately for Van Tassell the crucial yellow re-

ceipts c'O ncern1ng
·
the fourteen payment entries were not avai· 1 -'J le

4

co

h

im at the time of trial and were therefore not intro-

i.ncCJ "cideTJ.ce.

''lr. Grube testified that for the copies
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to be aligned after they had been removed from the
would have been extremely difficult and would have req·~ir::
someone of competence who knew how to use special eaui"-c-,
.r. . ._
~

order to make the copies consistent.

(Tr., p. 177).

Certainly, the existence of a second duplicate

('.O~:: _,

the disputed receipts and the admitted difficulty in duplieating such receipt out of the machine could have been a
serious consideration for a trier of fact in that '.!r. Brc,:water produced no receipts contradicting the fourteen receipts in dispute.
Van Tassell after inadvertently discovering these c::i,_

receipts after trial as explained in his affidavit of Jul . ·
1977 (R., pp.

437-440) attempted to offer these duplicate-:
(R., p.

pies to the trial court for its consideration.

]JJ

This offer was rejected by the trial court who obviousl:: '.:
made up its mind and refused to examine this new evidence.
While Appellant Van Tassell realizes a great deal o'. ::
cretion is left to a trial court in determining whether a:'
trial should be granted because of evidence it is also-~:;;
that the trial court must view the evidence objectivelv ac
cannot refuse such consideration of this new evidence.
trial court obviously believed that Van Tassell had pur5e:
self on the stanC. concerning the receipts

'--

JV

t

h

e

court' 5

ment suggesting to the plaintiff that the Count::
contacted.

(Tr., p. 19l).

It thus stand5 cJ reJ-' 11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

:·

-

;'~bsequent cffers of proof were highly questioned by the trial

court as

3.

furtherance of this scheme.

There can be no doubt that had these duplicate copies
1

een introduced at trial originally a serious question would

~a::e

:J.Tisen as to Van Tassell 's original story that the sig-

natures and notations were done in the machine before being
given to Broadwater.

The failure of Broadwater to produce a

single contradictory receipt in rebuttal would then give ereiihli ty to Van Tasse 11.
Appellant therefore submits that the omission of these
documents together with those mentioned in the motion concerning checks and other receipts were prejudicial to Van Tassell
and as stated in the affidavit could not have been produced
at the trial.

Appellant further submits that if a new trial

··ere held these documents would have a substantial effect upon

m impartial trier of fact and could be further analyzed by
anv experts either side might wish to call.

For these reasons,

the trial court erred in failincro to conclude that these documents may have had a significant effect upon the outcome of
the trial an d in
· f ailing to grant a new trial
·
so t h at sue h d o-

:,Jments could be introduced.

For this r9ason, a new trial should be ordered to give
. .:~,Tassell the opportunity to present this evidence.

"s ir;·.:ei

i:i

°'DDellants' brief in chief the court's de-
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cision at trial was not supported by the evidence.
especially true in two areas.

This i;

First, attorney's fees and,,

cond, interest.
As to attorney's fees the court arbitrarily awarded 2 ~.
proximately $8,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
pp. 191-192).

(r.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La 11

prepared by plaintiffs' attorney repeatedly reflect the no·
tation "a reasonable attorney's fee".

(R., pp. 378-386J. :

judgment and decree of foreclosure also reflect the award c.;
attorney's fees in excess of $8,000.
The record is absolutely void of any evidence presen:;;
by plaintiff concerning reasonable attorney's fees.

The

rt,;

is also void of any stipulation or agreement allowing the c:.
to make this conclusion based upon the court's own knowlec;e
The absence of any evidence to subs tan tia te these attorne::''
fees requires a modification of the judgment vacating this
amount.
This Court in F.M ...\..

Financial Corporation v. 3uild_l2.:

17 Utah Zd 80, 404 P.Zd 670 (1965) was faced with an iden::::
problem concerning the absence of evidence to support an
of attorney's fees.

a"·':

The Court stated that it is fundamer.t':

that a judgment be based upon findings of fact which int''
must be based upon the evidence.

The Court ackn·J'..;ledge~

judges have a special knowledge as to
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:<

vices and that if submitted upon stipulation a court may fix
the amow1t of attorney's fees without formally hearing evidence.
:·:ithout such evidenciary hearing or stipulation, however, this
court concluded that a judgment for attorney's fees must fail.
The Court stated:
Any one of these would have provided an
evidenciary basis for making the determination. However, it was an issue of
fact which was denied.
Thus it was a part
of the plaintiff's case to which it had
the burden of proving.
Failing to offer
proof of any character on this issue had
the same effect as would the failure to
offer proof as to any other controverted
issue. There is nothing upon which to
base a finding.
The defendant's objection that the finding as to attorney's
fees is not supported by any evidence is
well-taken and the judgment must be corrected in that particular.
(404 P. Zd at
673-674).
While it is true that appellants did not dispute the existence of the notes and mortgages there is no amount established
in the notes or mortgages concerning a reasonable attorney's
fee.

Plaintiff failed in its burden of showing what a reason-

able attorney's fee was in reference to those notes and mortgages admitted into evidence.

For this reason, the award of

attornev' s fees should be vacated.
Finallv

'' the court granted judgment with interest at 8 per

ce,H prior to the time of judgment.

Even though the testimony

to the effect that Van Tassell defaulted al-

ir all obligations the court allowed 8 per
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cent interest to be charged even thouah
the notes spe Cl f lCa
~
stated "legal" interest.

Exhibits L, G, and E all refer

cc·

either "legal"
or "legal
rate" when speaking- i·n terms oi in~
terest at default.

The notes read as follows:

Any installments of principal and interest
not paid when due shall, at the option of
the legal holder hereof, bear interest thereafter at the rate of (legal) per annum until
paid.
Only Exhibit J in the amow1t of $4, 500 specifically stated
"eight" per cent per annum.
Since Section 15-1-1 defines the legal rate of interesbefore judgment as 6 per cent the court obviously erred i".
puting the 8 per cent rate.

Thus, this Court should orde:,

recomputa tion of the interest as to those no"Ces containing
the legal rate amount and should r.-.odify the judgment accori·
ingly.

Peterson v. Western Casualtv and Surety Company,

i::

P.2d 769 (Utah 1967).
In summary, the trial cour"C obviously chose to belie':C
Broadwater' s version of the story as opposed to Van Tasse'.:
This was his privilege.

However, this belief could not p:'·

vent the court from objectively looking at new evidence cc:
available at trial which could have had a substantial e::::·
~.: ~;

upon the court's decision had it been originally intro,,,_.,
The failure to give Van Tassell an opportunity to
this evidence anew to a an impartial trier of fact was er:
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Regardless of the other subjective areas of decision concerning the court's judgment and findings there can be no
doubt that Broadwater failed to prove what a reasonable attar~ey's

fee would be under the circumstances and failed to ob-

tain a stipulation that the court could decide this question
without evidence.

Further, the court erred in allowing 8 per

cent interest on obligations which clearly stated the legal
rate of interest which is 6 per cent.
For these reasons, if the judgment is affirmed it should
be modified accordingly.

Respectfully submitted,

~bk
Attorney for Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

